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Duty of Care after Robinson: Has the Caparo Test Been Retired?
Student Name
Department, University Name
LAW 2101: Law of Tort
Professor Name
12 November 2026
Duty of Care after Robinson: Has the Caparo Test Been Retired?
For three decades, students of tort learned that a duty of care in negligence depends on a three-stage test: foreseeability of harm, proximity between the parties, and whether it is fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty. The test was attributed to Caparo Industries plc v Dickman.1 In Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police the Supreme Court said that this reading of Caparo was mistaken.2 This essay argues that Robinson did not abolish the Caparo factors but returned them to their proper place: as guidance for genuinely new situations, not a formula applied to every claim.
From the Neighbour Principle to a General Test
The modern law begins with Lord Atkin’s neighbour principle in Donoghue v Stevenson, which required reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions that one can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure one’s neighbour.3 The principle was a unifying idea rather than a rule of decision, and later courts debated how far it should reach. In Anns v Merton London Borough Council Lord Wilberforce proposed a two-stage approach: a prima facie duty arising from proximity, limited only by policy considerations pointing the other way.4 The approach was criticised for expanding liability too readily, especially for pure economic loss, and Anns was departed from in Murphy v Brentwood District Council.5
It was in this climate that Lord Bridge, in Caparo, set out the ingredients of foreseeability, proximity and fairness, while warning that these concepts were not precise and that the law should develop incrementally and by analogy with established categories.6 That warning was often forgotten. Over time the three ingredients hardened into a test, and courts and students alike began to apply it to every negligence claim, including ones in long-settled categories such as road accidents and medical treatment.
What Robinson Decided
In Robinson an elderly pedestrian was knocked over when police officers arrested a suspect in a busy street. The Court of Appeal held that the police owed no duty, relying on public policy reasons associated with Caparo. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal. Lord Reed explained that Caparo did not lay down a tripartite test to be applied in every case.7 Where a case falls within an established category, such as the duty not to cause physical injury by positive acts, the court applies the existing law. Only in novel cases should it reason by analogy from decided cases and, where necessary, consider whether extending liability would be fair, just and reasonable.
The decision also clarified the position of public authorities. The police are generally subject to the same principles of negligence as private individuals, so they may be liable for injuries caused by their own positive acts. They are not, however, generally under a duty to protect people from harm caused by third parties, a point already confirmed in Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police.8 The distinction between causing harm and failing to prevent it therefore does more work after Robinson than any open-ended policy inquiry.
Evaluation
The incremental approach has clear advantages. It promotes consistency, because like cases are decided alike, and it keeps policy reasoning for the hard cases where it is genuinely needed. It also corrects a practical distortion: defendants could previously argue that almost any claim failed the fairness stage, adding cost and uncertainty to straightforward litigation. Critics respond that reasoning by analogy still requires judgment about which analogies matter, so policy has not disappeared but moved out of sight. That criticism has force, yet it is better for value judgments to be confined and openly identified than spread across every case.
Conclusion
Robinson did not retire Caparo. It retired a misreading of it. The questions of foreseeability, proximity and fairness remain relevant when a court is asked to recognise a new duty, but they are no longer a gateway every claimant must pass through. For students, the lesson is to begin by asking whether the facts fall within an established category, and to reach for the Caparo factors only when they do not.
1 Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL).
2 Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736.
3 Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL) 580.
4 Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL).
5 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 (HL).
6 Caparo (n 1) 617–18.
7 Robinson (n 2) [21].
8 Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732.
Bibliography
Table of Cases
Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728 (HL)
Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605 (HL)
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562 (HL)
Michael v Chief Constable of South Wales Police [2015] UKSC 2, [2015] AC 1732
Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398 (HL)
Robinson v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police [2018] UKSC 4, [2018] AC 736
Sample paper by Professor Eric · For study and reference only. Do not submit it as your own work.